UK defence: underfunded, overdue, unprepared

IN THE FIRST PART of this series of articles I examined the broad parameters within which the UK’s defence policies should operate and in general terms what is required to make them fit for purpose. In this second part I look at funding and touch on defence equipment procurement.

So, what is to be done? Well, if we’re going to be serious about UK defence and security, the first thing that needs to be considered is the defence budget. Currently just over £60 billion per annum, or roughly 2.3 per cent of GDP, it is quite frankly nowhere near enough in the circumstances in which the UK now finds itself.

However, this budget includes the various costs associated with maintaining and renewing Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent, plus military pensions and sundry other items. If these are stripped out, then the actual percentage of GDP currently being allocated to defence may be as low as 1.4 per cent.

Putting this to one side for the moment, the Prime Minister pledged to increase UK defence spending from this clearly paltry 2.3 per cent to 2.5 per cent by 2027 and to 3 per cent “in the next Parliament”, the latter promise being so vague and weasel-worded that it’s not worth the paper it’s written on.

And most recently, following yet more agitation and threats from the Trump administration in Washington, Starmer fell in line with other European NATO allies in committing the UK to spend 3.5 per cent of GDP on defence by 2035, plus a cosmetic fudge factor additional 1.5 per cent on “defence-related infrastructure” – which can mean virtually anything you want it to – to reach a symbolic five per cent.

In layman’s terms this would suggest an increase up to perhaps £140 billion per annum, which is substantial even if inflation proves unfriendly.

the UK can’t wait to up its defence budget in ten years’ time

Which would be absolutely fine and a bold step in the right direction, if only it were to happen sooner. The danger is now, not in 2035, and when you go to war you go with what you have, not what you’d like to have. Telling potential enemies to wait until you’re ready in five years’ time isn’t going to wash.

Frankly, the UK can’t wait to up its defence budget in ten years’ time, it has to be done now, or as near to now as is feasible. Where will the money come from? It’s clear to me that it can’t be done without an increase in taxes, but also through a shift in spending priorities from other areas.

For a start we should be looking at removing Britain’s nuclear weaponry from the defence budget altogether and putting it under a separate, standalone budget heading as it was in the past. This will undoubtedly be a step in the right direction.

The NHS is probably sacrosanct for now, but Britain’s bloated welfare budget – projected to be around £313 billion to £384 billion for the 2024-2025 fiscal year – makes it the largest area of public expenditure, with major components including State Pensions (around £125bn), Universal Credit (£60bn), and disability benefits (around £50bn), with forecasts showing continued increases driven by pensioner and disability support.

That’s between five and six times the current UK defence budget. It’s unsustainable. And we could also divert funds from the irrational and unachievable pursuit of net zero, another major waste of resources.

If we accept that the UK defence budget has to be boosted quam celerrime, then we also have to tackle the problem of MoD incompetence and profligacy at the same time. In particular, MoD equipment procurement processes are a by-word for delay and waste of money. There is a long list of equipment procurement programmes which have gone over budget and have been subject to delay.

The daddy of them all is the tortuous and farcical attempt to procure a new armoured cavalry vehicle known as Ajax. Now over eight years late and heading north of £6.3 billion in total cost, it is a salutary lesson in how not to undertake defence equipment procurement. After many problems with noise and vibration, in late 2025 its Initial Operating Capability (IOC) was declared only to be withdrawn two weeks later as its problems had clearly not been fixed. At time of writing, it is subject to a “do not use” order.

I could go on but would risk boring the reader. Suffice to say I have written about such problems many times before. This example concerns army programmes but the same could apply to RN and RAF procurement too, albeit to varying degrees.

In my next article I’ll be making some recommendations on major defence priorities for an incoming Reform government (or indeed for any political party forming the next Westminster administration).