Rebuilding Britain’s defences: Why the UK needs urgent reform now

IN THE FIRST two parts of this series of articles I laid out the broad parameters within which the UK’s defence policy should operate and, in general terms, what is required to make it fit for purpose, followed by a discussion of funding and a brief examination of defence equipment procurement. In this part I set out a series of concrete actions that now need to be taken.

The immediate and most important action, in my view, is that, as previously stated, a new defence review must be undertaken straight away. It is quite clear that the SDR 2025 delivered by George Robertson and his team is already obsolete. For reasons already discussed, it is predicated on a “NATO First” premise which is no longer applicable given recent geopolitical events – not least of which is Trump’s White House administration’s diminishing engagement with Europe and the shifting threat landscape posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.

A new and genuinely up-to-date Review is required, reflecting this altered strategic environment: defence of the UK must come first; defence of UK interests abroad second; and only then should commitments to NATO be considered. It should not consist of bland statements of intent but must rigorously set out both the rationale and the operational implications of policy choices, and be fully and transparently costed based on available data – not deferred to some future spending review.

Following this, there should be a proper reassessment of the defence budget, with a realistic spending plan aligned to actual requirements. Any increase in defence-oriented spending should be as immediate as possible, with funds being diverted from other less pressing priorities as mentioned previously. The UK should be targeting defence expenditure of 5% of GDP as rapidly as practicable — not over a protracted ten-year horizon.

“new” equipment enters service when it is already obsolescent, if not obsolete

Next, there needs to be an in-depth assessment of MoD equipment procurement processes. Current practices and processes are sclerotic, inefficient and rooted in assumptions about what was deemed acceptable in the 1950s. They are no longer viable given the pace of technological change, which now sees “new” equipment entering service when it is already obsolescent, if not obsolete. Again, Ajax is a prime example.

This area requires serious and forensic consideration, and there can be no sacred cows. It may take radical action. In 1940, Churchill famously made Canadian newspaper magnate Lord Beaverbrook his Minister for Aircraft Production to boost production and counter the Luftwaffe, giving him almost dictatorial powers. Perhaps it’s time to consider doing something along the same lines? I’m sure the likes of Lord Sugar, Sir James Dyson, or Sir Tom Hunter would relish the challenge.

At the same time, and staying with procurement, is it actually necessary for the MoD to buy all the equipment for the armed forces? Leasing materiel may offer a more flexible and financially rational approach kitting out Britain’s armed forces. The potential advantages include transferring some risk to industry and smoothing the MoD’s characteristically volatile expenditure profile. Again, I have written about this before. It is worth exploring further.

More people have been leaving the services than have been recruited

We must also address personnel recruitment across all three services. I suspect that most people are aware that the record of recruitment into the RN, Army, and RAF over the past couple of decades has left much to be desired. More people have been leaving the services than have been recruited, leaving ships idle for lack of crews, aircraft grounded for lack of pilots, and battalions under strength for want of soldiers.

To be fair, it appears that the situation here may have improved over recent months. Recent data suggest that inflow has, for the first time since early 2021, exceeded outflow. Overall intake has increased by thirteen per cent compared to the previous twelve-month period (to October 2025), while outflow has decreased by eight per cent.

Nevertheless, structural challenges remain. The overall trained strength of the Armed Forces continues to shrink due to sustained historical shortfalls, while voluntary outflow remains the primary driver of personnel losses. The gap between intake and outflow is narrow, meaning the personnel landscape is still considered pressured, and it will take time for the trained strength to rebuild to target levels.

The MoD has partnered with Serco to launch a new, unified Armed Forces Recruitment Service (AFRS) across all three services by 2027, with the stated aim of reducing bureaucracy and improving efficiency.

Even so, the average time for a soldier to join is now an average of five months, a twenty-five per cent decrease since 2015 but still a shocking indictment of the state of army recruitment. The whole process should be able to be achieved in weeks, as it was under the old Army Recruitment Office regime. Outsourcing recruitment has been a disaster and needs to be reversed.

Finally, I am in no doubt that the Army’s recent recruiting travails are closely linked to the loss of territorial affiliations within many regimental structures. In Scotland, for example, the diffuse and impersonal nature of recruitment into the Royal Regiment of Scotland (RRS), fine soldiers though they are, has had a negative impact. Where once a youngster might aspire to join his or her local regiment – the Royal Highland Fusiliers for example, who traditionally recruited in Glasgow and Ayrshire – they are now likely to be directed into whatever battalion of the RRS needs them the most.

This approach is strategically counterproductive and should be reversed at the earliest opportunity. Bring back the historic regiments and battalions and their traditional recruiting areas across the UK!

Lastly, I have to address PR and media communications. There is no point in beating about the bush – the MoD has been howlingly awful at both since as far back as I can remember. Again, I have written on this very topic in the past, here and again here.

The Americans are much, much better at dealing with the media and we could learn much from how they go about it. The media isn’t the enemy, they’re a force multiplier if you realise that they’re usually onside and just crave information. A complete revamp of MoD media management is long overdue.